When states encourage migration. The institutionalisation of French overseas-mainland migration and its effect on migrant selection

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INTRODUCTION

While scholars have long been interested in border policing and mobility restrictions, the effects of public policies fostering migration remain under-investigated. This paper extends our knowledge on migration selectivity and the impact migration policies have on it, by analyzing a case of State-sponsored mobility. Looking at migration from the French Overseas departments (DOM) to metropolitan France, we study to what extent the profiles of migrant benefiting from migration aid differ from those of other migrants and non-migrants. As French citizens, the populations of the DOM can migrate to metropolitan France without any legal barriers. More than one in four French Caribbean lives in metropolitan France, one in six Guyanese, and one in seven Reunionese[1]. Such prevalence of migration reflects the better employment prospects the mainland offers compared to the DOM, but more importantly a long history of policies promoting DOM-mainland mobility. Since the 1960's, migration offices have incited mobility through communication campaigns, financial support, and recruitment programs. The range of their action has evolved through time and a significant share of migrants have moved without their support, making DOM-mainland migrations a great case study to compare migrant selection in various policy contexts.

This paper uses a representative survey conducted in the French Overseas departments by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (*Migration Family Ageing*, INED, 2010) with detailed information on within-household migration decisions, from 1960 to 2010. Our sample includes migrants who benefited from migration aid, migrants who did not benefit from it, and non-migrants. Using duration models with a multilevel structure, we assess the effect of individual and parental characteristics on the chances of migration with and without public aid. As many migrants from the DOM move before entering the labor market or even achieving their education, highest degree or occupational skills imperfectly capture the

[1] Source: French Census (INSEE, 2014)

selective dimension of migration. Policies have targeted potential migrants based on their economic resources, their employment prospects, but also the aspirations they associate with migrating, by setting project-oriented requirements (meaning for instance that some migration grants are only opened to those wanting to access training or courses of higher education that are not available in the DOM). We therefore focus on selection based on parental education and occupational position, and on the threshold of the junior higher degree for individual education. Results reveal a trend of increasing selection over time, for both types of migration. They display a clear tipping point in 1982, when migration policies deeply changed. Before 1982, unsubsidized migration was not selective, while subsidized migration was more likely for individuals with parents at the low end of the educational distribution. After 1982, both types of migration became increasingly selected, but not according to the same criteria. Results therefore show that, while migration aid benefits the less well-off, project-oriented requirements combined with bureaucratic procedures generate forms of selection that mitigate this democratizing effect.

This paper contributes to the literature on two levels. First, while there are some studies of pro-migration policies (Martin 2006; Meléndez 2017), we lack an empirical assessment of their effects on migration flows and we know little about the specificities of migrants benefiting from migration aid, compared to other migrants. Using a case of State-sponsored migration, this research offers evidence of how migration aid reshapes migrant selection. Second, this paper adds to the debate on the growing restrictiveness of migration policies (De Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2016; Castles 2006), shifting the focus from legal barriers to policies of access to migration. States influence access to migration through restrictive, liberalizing, but also migration-facilitating policies. Our case study shows that, with a diversity of objectives and tools, pro-migration policies do not equally benefit all

citizens, suggesting limited efficacy. It confirms that migration has become more selective rather than more restrictive.

MIGRATION POLICIES AND MIGRANTS' SOCIOECONOMIC SELECTION

Non-linear migrant selection and legal provisions

Migrant selection is the unequal distribution of socioeconomic characteristics between movers and stayers: we may talk of negative selection when migrants display lower skills, resources or wealth than their counterparts stayed in the home society, net of their migration experience's effect. The words "negative" and "positive" therefore summarize a position relative to the distribution of a certain characteristic, not the desirability of some migrants over others. While the use of this concept has indeed emerged in political debates over migration regulation with the concern for attracting desirable migrants, in the academic realm, researchers have been interested in selection for at least two other reasons. First, to study migrants' trajectories and avoid a *selection bias*, we need to differentiate pre-migration characteristics from characteristics that result from the migration experience. Second, selection is part of the answer to the questions "Who migrates? And why?".

While research has primarily focused on push-pull factors of migration, it has also demonstrated the importance of other dimensions, such as cultural and institutional factors (Massey 1999). Migration scripts, networks, brokers and laws drive migration just as differences in the opportunity structures of home and host societies do. These mediating drivers may facilitate or constraint mobility, such that migrants are not always the ones the push-pull theory would expect to profit the most from migration, and selection reflects that. Selection results from the interplay between drivers of migration and individual agency, understood as desires embedded in relational and macro structures and the power to act according to them (Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long 2018). The literature underlines the

potential discrepancy between aspirations and capabilities (Carling and Schewel 2018): the conviction that migration is preferable to non-migration – based on the comparison of places, culturally defined projects and matters of identity – is not always matched with the power to migrate.

On the one hand, the opportunity structure in more developed regions might make them more attractive to potential migrants with lower SES. Inspired by Roy's model of occupational choice (1951), Borjas (1987) argues that low-skilled migrants are attracted to more equalitarian societies where their income will depend less on their skills. On the other hand, migration's costs and barriers make it more accessible to individuals with more resources. Studies show that the relation between wealth and migration displays a reverse U-shape, both for internal and international migration (Du, Park, and Wang 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). Such findings hint that wealthier individuals do not aspire to migrate, while poorer individuals are not able to migrate. In their study of Norwegian-US migration at the beginning of the 20th century, Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2012) do find a negative selection of migrants. They suggest that legal barriers to migration explain the reverse U-shape more commonly found and that, in absence of such barriers, we should expect a negative selection. Here again the idea is that stayers at the low end of the income distribution aspire to migrate but are the first to suffer from legal barriers.

Results on human capital, as measured by occupational sector or educational level, are also mixed. While broad studies suggest that migration has become negatively selected (Borjas 1985), empirical results focused on specific migrant groups show positive selection (Ortiz 1986; Xing 2014), intermediary selection (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005), or no selection (Melendez 1994). Legal barriers matter there as well: increased restrictions on migration produce a non-linear relation between education and migration, such that migrants come from the middle of the educational distribution (Lu, Liang, and David 2013). This

suggests that selectivity based on human capital is more pronounced when barriers to migration are high and that, at the same time, the most educated have better employment prospects locally.

We could expect the effect of public policies encouraging migration and legal barrier on migrant selection to be opposite, but the literature rarely addresses it. Additionally, in such studies, the policy dimension is only a contextual variable. While studying selection in different policy contexts informs us on which individuals are the most affected by mobility restrictions, we lack empirical analyses comparing selection throughout channels of migration: not only authorized migration compared to unauthorized migration, but also across different types of authorized migration. To understand the mechanisms through which policies affect migrant selection, we need to compare selection between migrants who engage with them and migrants who do not. Migration policies shape capabilities, but they are also likely to influence aspirations, by promoting migration scripts and defining desirable migration.

Pro-migration policies and migration aid

Over the 20th century, comprehensive migration programs have promoted the growth of migration flows to many Western countries (Martin 2006). They mostly targeted migrant workers, but could also include family reunification provisions (Hwang and Parreñas 2010). In France, the National Office for Immigration (1945-1974) played a key role in importing labor from foreign Southern European countries and former colonies (Perdoncin 2018). In the US, the two largest programs were the *Bracero* program (1942-1964) for migration from Mexico (Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018) and the *Farm Labor Program* (1948-1990) for migration from Puerto-Rico (Meléndez 2017). While these programs aimed at temporary migration (the *revolving door* policies), migrants often managed to achieve permanent

settlement (De Genova 2004). The 1973 crisis marked a turning point, with France for instance officially stopping its labor migration policy in 1974 (Laurens 2008). Yet, the global demand for migrant workers has remained high. Western countries have not managed to design large-scale migration schemes (which translates in higher levels of illegal migration), but Asian countries have, often with contract labor systems (Castles 2006). Contrary to the belief that migration policies have been increasingly restrictive since 1973, evidence shows a liberalizing trend: it is rather the selection of migrants through those policies that has changed (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2018).

Migration policies select migrants by targeting specific groups, whether in terms of nationality, type of migration or other sociodemographic attributes. However, the effect of migration policies on migrant selection does not only depend on their framing at the macro level. Like with any other social right, how potential migrants receive and engage with these policies matter. Not everyone who has a right to something will exert this right, such that there is a gap between formal access and effective access (Bargain, Immervoll, and Viitamäki 2012). Effective access depends on many factors, such as knowledge of the rights, trust in the public system, fear of stigma, and ability to claim the right (Oorschot 1991). Public officers have leeway in enforcing policies, which leaves room for negotiation, but not everyone has the same resources to negotiate (Desprès 2008; Dubois 1999). Research already elicits how the narrative framing of legitimate migration, migrants' self-presentation and the bureaucratic relation matter in determining access to legal status (Galli 2018; Galli 2019; Lakhani 2013; Schittenhelm and Schneider 2017). We can expect that such dimensions also shape access to the resources offered by migration programs.

MIGRATION FROM THE FRENCH OVERSEAS DEPARTMENTS

Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and La Réunion were part of the first wave of French colonization and were involved in slave trade. With the abolition of slavery in 1848, all inhabitants of these regions gained French citizenship. After World War II, they voted against independence and these regions officially became French departments. This assimilation trajectory explains why, contrary to other Caribbean former colonies, the DOM benefited not only from open-border policies, but also from pro-migration policies[2]. At the end of the 1950's, faced with unemployment rates up to 40% and political unrest, the French government framed the booming population of the DOM as a public issue (Domenach and Picouet 1992). Their response was twofold: first, limiting population growth through campaigns encouraging birth control; second, displacing the surplus of population through organized migration. Bringing migrants to metropolitan France would also answer the labor shortage in the public service and meet the demand for low-qualified workers in state industries and the private sector (Condon and Ogden 1991a; Condon and Ogden 1991b; Pattieu 2017). The booming economy facilitated recruitment in low-skilled jobs for migrants from all socioeconomic backgrounds and this favorable context translated in migration policies. Pro-migration policies first targeted discharged soldiers and men drafted for military service, but they rapidly extended their scope to a wide range of populations (table 1).

The Office for DOM Migration or Bumidom[3] channeled migrations between 1963 and 1983, though a significant share of migrants did not use its services[4]. The organization offered

[2] In the post-colonial Caribbean, attempts to limit movement from the former colonies to their former mainland have not hindered emigration but rather diversified regions of destination, while open-borders policies have favored the perpetuation of rather exclusive flows to the former mainland (Flahaux and Vezzoli 2018; Vezzoli and Flahaux 2017).

[3] *Bureau pour la migration des DOM*

[4] Archival documents report that 160,300 migrants benefited from the Bumidom, while census data estimates that 207,800 DOM migrants entered metropolitan France between 1962 and 1982. However, estimates of the share of Bumidom migrants from retrospective surveys are much lower, suggesting both that migrants

aid for migration with little requirements, funding plane tickets and granting small loans to facilitate settlement. Migrants could also go through a more comprehensive program, with training and recruitment: the Bumidom worked in collaboration with the national occupational training program (*Association pour la Formation professionnelle des Adultes* or AFPA), which managed male workers, and with the ministry for Population, Health and Social services, which managed female workers. Last, family reunification was also part of the Bumidom's prerogatives. Despite much disillusionment[5], migrants were able to use the institution as a stepping-stone. Each DOM did not equally benefit from the policies. If migrants from any DOM could ask for aid once in metropolitan France, the Bumidom only held offices and recruitment campaigns in Martinique, Guadeloupe and La Réunion. In La Réunion, pro-migration policies were particularly active: in 1965, Michel Debré – former prime minister and MP for La Réunion -, founded the National committee for reception and actions towards Reunionese in mobility (CNARM), with prerogatives similar to those of the Bumidom. Research suggests that these policies gave access to migration to people who would not have migrated otherwise[6] (Haddad 2018), but knowledge on migrant selection during that period is limited.

[table 1 about here]

The economic downturn following the 1973 crisis affected migrants directly, because they faced more tense labor and housing markets, and indirectly, through less generous migration programs. Public institutions tried to address new budgetary constraints and activists' demands by redefining the type of migration that public funds should

underreport their use of mobility aid and that the office kept records of entries even when they had little influence on migrants' departure.

[5] The program did not provide decent access to housing; the training centers were focused on facilitating adaptation to French customs rather than providing skills useful on the job market; the workers were sent where labor force was needed but with little chance of upward mobility (Constant 1987; Pattieu 2016; Pattieu 2017)

[6] Using a difference-in-difference model on census data over the 1968-1999 period, with French Guyana as the counterfactual, Haddad (2018) shows that that the action of the Bumidom in the French Caribbean and La Réunion between 1963 and 1981 had a significant positive impact on the size of migration flows.

subsidize (Marie and Giraud 1987). The Bumidom was dissolved in 1981. The National Agency for Integration and Protection of Overseas Workers (ANT) replaced it in 1982. The organization changed again to become the Overseas Agency for Mobility in 2010. Public policies shifted from a paradigm of "mass migration" to a paradigm of "youth mobility":

"*The mobility of young people towards the metropolis will be promoted by reforming deeply the National Agency for the Integration and Protection of Overseas Workers, by concluding partnership and twinning agreements between schools and academics from overseas, metropolitan France and Europe, and by introducing the 'mobility passport'*."

Jacques Chirac, "Mon engagement pour l'Outre-mer", April 2002 (program booklet published during his campaign for the 2002 presidential election)

This new vocabulary came with new constraints: from that point onward, potential migrants had to meet restrictive criteria in order to access the programs. To show that they met these criteria, they have had to demonstrate specific aspirations associated with migrating and administrative skills, such as filling-out forms and bringing the right paperwork.

Available to potential migrants since 2002, the "mobility passport" divides in two channels, based on potential migrants' projects. The mobility passport for education consists of a financial aid for a round-trip plane ticket each year. It is only accessible to students younger than 26 enrolled in a course that is not available in the DOM and whose household taxable resources do not exceed a given income cap[7]. It cannot be renewed if the students fail their annual exams twice. The mobility passport for occupational training consists of both financial support and guidance throughout the migration stay and is accessible to adults with a "project of employment integration". In their application, prospective migrants have to describe their educational trajectory and career path and they have to prove either the necessity for a specific training or the promise of a minimum 6-month contract in

[7] In 2020, according to the website of Ladom (www. mobilite.ladom.fr) this cap was of 26,631€.

metropolitan France. They have to be registered as unemployed and their household taxable income should not exceed the income cap. Since 2003, prospective migrants with no specific project but with significantly lower income[8] can also pretend to the "territorial continuity" mobility aid, which finances round-trip plane tickets every three years with no other requirement that the documents certifying their birthplace and income. The CNARM still operates and, in some cases, the Regional Center for University and School Works (Crous) and other regional institutions can provide migrants with financial support for their migration: the fragmentation of state support makes the migration aid system even less legible.

As a result of this new policy design, access to migration aid should be more selective, *de jure* (prospective migrants have to meet restrictive criteria) and *de facto* (they need to know what aid is available to them, design the appropriate project, write the application and put together the right documents). Since there are no legal barriers to migration to metropolitan France, being denied migration aid does not equate being unable to migrate, but these restrictions are likely to reshape migrant selection. Unemployment rates in the DOM are still high (Treyens and Catherine 2015) and migrants keep leaving the DOM in search for better career opportunities, encouraged by local employment agencies and social services, which have worked jointly with the ANT and now collaborate with Ladom (Ihaddadene 2017). Guadeloupe and Martinique have taken a step back from encouraging emigration, while pro-migration policies have remained important in La Réunion and limited in French Guyana (Ihaddadene and Leroux 2017). The literature on DOM migrations underscores the change in economic context in metropolitan France, which seems to have fostered positive selection for DOM migrants (Temporal, Marie, and Bernard 2011), but says little on how migration policies may have mitigated or stressed this trend.

[8] The income cap for territorial continuity aid was 11,991€ in 2020.

DATA AND METHODS

Survey presentation and sampling

Migration Family Ageing (MFV) is a representative survey conducted in the DOM by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED). MFV provides in-depth information about the migration experience of 15,770 respondents and those of their relatives[9]. Its structure is similar to the Mexican Migration Project and to the Migration between Africa and Europe Project. These quasi-longitudinal surveys (Liu et al. 2016) provide detailed variables about the timing of migrations and other life events, which enable the researcher to rebuild panel-structured data. We use the data on the respondents' offspring (n=32,260), which allows us to observe individuals nested in family units. While respondents all lived in the DOM during the survey, their children may live in the DOM, in metropolitan France, or in a foreign country. In this analysis, we focus on adult migration of overseas natives to mainland France[10]. This setting excludes DOM migrants who had no parent living in the DOM at the time of the survey. It may drive an upward bias in terms of selection, as a larger migrant network often mitigates selection based on SES (Boustan 2013). However, since those migrants represent a small share of DOM migrants who migrated after 14, the bias to our sample should be limited[11].

[9] INED targeted the respondents in collaboration with the French Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). It sampled households from the whole population using the information collected through the French national census.

[10] Migration to mainland France is by far the most common case of lasting migration: 77% of the respondents' offspring still live in the DOM, 22% live in mainland France and 1% live abroad.

[11] Using *Trajectories and Origins*, a representative survey conducted by the INED in metropolitan France between 2008 and 2009, we estimate that 19% of DOM migrants had neither a mother nor a father parent living in the DOM and that 66% of them had migrated before they were 15. In 2009, 9% of migrants from the DOM who had migrated after the age of 14 had no parent living in the DOM.

We reduce the sample to respondents' children born in the DOM[12] (n=27,275), aged 15 or more (n=16,856). We exclude individuals who migrated elsewhere than metropolitan France (n=16,588) and individuals who migrated before they were 15 (n=15,179). We chose 15 as a threshold from which potential migrants are more likely to migrate on their own. While migration before 15 occurs mostly to follow one's parent, it is frequent for individuals to move without their parents after that age, even if it is just in order to attend high school in metropolitan France (Condon and Byron 2007). The data does not provide the departure and return dates for the respondents' children if they are return migrants: since we cannot place their migration on a timeline nor consider them as non-migrants, we exclude them and their siblings from the sample (n=13,998). While we expect return migrants to differ from migrants still in metropolitan France, robustness checks suggest that excluding them does not yield significant change[13]. Once we remove the observations with missing data, the sample comprises 13,447 individuals.

Sample description

For each relative currently living outside the DOMs, respondents answer the following question: "*To your knowledge has <NAME OF THE RELATIVE> received any public assistance for this stay?*" They select one or several options among the following: "No, none"; "Bumidom"; "ANT"; "Cnarm"[14]; "Crous"[15]; "Regional funding"; State (*passeport mobilité*)"; "Other". Among respondents' offspring, we distinguish unsubsidized migrants ("No, none") from subsidized migrants (any other option) based on this variable.

[12] The birthplace restriction drops children of people who moved to the DOM after starting a family elsewhere. For those children, going back to metropolitan France does not implicate the same migration experience; part of them never even left the mainland.

[13] Static models including this subpopulation were estimated using multinomial logistic regressions, controlling for birth cohort instead of time-period. Their results are consistent with the same models estimated on the restricted population (tables A1 and A2 in appendix).

[14] National Committee for Reunionese in Mobility (*Comité national d'accueil et d'actions pour les Réunionnais en mobilité*)

[15] Regional Center for University and School Works (*Centre régional des œuvres universitaires et scolaires*)

Table 2 describes the main characteristics of the sample. The average number of siblings varies from 3.4 (subsidized migrants), to 3.2 (stayers) and 3.1 (unsubsidized migrants). The birth order is higher for subsidized migrants (2.1) than for stayers (1.9) and unsubsidized migrants (1.8). Migrants hold a junior high degree more often than stayers do, especially subsidized migrants (91% against 73% of stayers and 88% of unsubsidized migrants). On the one hand, there is little to no difference between the educational levels and occupational positions of the parents of stayers and subsidized migrants. On the other hand, unsubsidized migrants' parents are significantly more educated than others are (24% of unsubsidized migrants have a parent with at least a high school degree against 15% of stayers and 15% of subsidized migrants). They use more frequently French as the primary language to speak to their children (79% against 70 and 67%) and they work more often in upper positions (13% against 5 and 6%). This suggests that migration programs mitigate the positive selection of DOM-mainland migrations.

[table 2 about here]

Estimation strategy

To understand better those mechanisms over time, we estimate discrete-time duration models on the probability of migrating with public aid and the probability of migrating without public aid, compared to not migrating. We observe each individual from the age of 15 to either year of survey (2010, for non-migrants) or year of migration (for migrants). The dependent variable is the migration status coded into three categories: "*still living in their DOM of birth*" (0), "*has moved to mainland France without public funding*" (1), and "*has moved to mainland France with public funding*" (2). If the variable takes the value of 1 or 2 at year *t* the individual leaves the panel in *t+1*. We use multilevel modeling with a random intercept for each cluster of siblings in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity.

The model is specified as follow:

$$\log\left(\frac{\mathbb{P}(migrates\ without\ public\ aid)_{jit}}{\mathbb{P}(stays)_{jit}}\right) = \alpha_1 X_{ji} + \beta_1 K_{ji(t-1)} + \gamma_{0j} + \varepsilon_{jit}$$

$$\log\left(\frac{\mathbb{P}(migrates\ with\ public\ aid)_{jit}}{\mathbb{P}(stays)_{jit}}\right) = \widetilde{\alpha_1} X_{ji} + \widetilde{\beta_1} K_{ji(t-1)} + \gamma_{0j} + \widetilde{\varepsilon_{jit}}$$

Where X_{ji} is a vector of fixed individual characteristics, K_{jit} is a vector of time-dependent characteristics, and γ_{0j} the random slope for each cluster of siblings.

Independent variables include age, gender, number of siblings, birth order, individual and parental education, parental occupation, which parent was the respondent, and time period (1960-1981; 1982-1997; 1998-2010). We indicate which parent was the respondent since we only have information on parental education and occupation for the parent who was the respondent[16] and we expect the effect of those characteristics to vary depending on the gender of the parent. Research shows that, for young migrants, parental SES is a stronger driver of migrant selection than individual SES (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012; Cohen 2011). Following that literature and considering the fact that most DOM migrants move around the age of 20 or before, we give more weight to parental resources than to individual resources. There is no information on income or estate over time in the survey. We capture socioeconomic resources using parental occupation[17] (lower vs. intermediate or upper), two measures of education (one at the individual level and one at the parental level), and an indicator of the language spoken at home.

[16] The survey does provide with information on the cohabiting partner but respondents with a cohabiting partner who is also the parent of their children represent a share of the sample that is too small to use consistently that information.

[17] In the MFV survey, respondents indicate their occupation and education, and that of their cohabiting partner. However, in many cases, there is no cohabiting partner or the partner is not the parent of the respondent's children. As a result, we control for only the characteristics of the respondent parent, adding a variable to indicate whether it was the mother or the father.

The survey only provides with the education level of the respondents' offspring in 2010 and not with a graduation date for the highest degree obtained: we cannot identify changes in individual education over time. Yet, studies show that many overseas migrants further their education once in the mainland (Temporal, Marie, and Bernard 2011), such that education in 2010 is not a viable proxy for education at time of migration. Since the panel starts at age 15 and since individuals with at least a junior high degree have generally obtained it between the ages of 14 and 15, this educational threshold is a more reliable pre-migratory characteristic. It does not go into the details of educational selectivity but it is discriminating enough (30% of individuals in the sample do not hold a junior high degree). On the one hand, degrees sanction skills that position individuals on the labor market and affect their job opportunities. On the other hand, they also capture educational aspirations, as well as the ability to negotiate the bureaucratic interaction (Dubois 1999; Lipsky 1980). As a result, our analysis does not unable us to determine if a change in educational selectivity stems from more restrictive criteria in terms of educational aspirations or skills or from bureaucratic barriers.

For parental education, educational levels largely increased over the period and using a fixed nomenclature of degrees would show an artificially increasing selection. Instead, we use a relative approach that has proven robust to investigate migrant selection (Feliciano 2005; Ichou 2014): we include a variable that measures the share of the parent's birth cohort with a lower educational level than the parent. Parental education is decisive in predicting children's educational aspirations and performances, but other factors affect the quality of capital transmission (Chiswick 1988). The language spoken at home is one of those factors (Santos and Wolff 2011), including for parents from the DOM who may speak creole instead of French to their children (Valat forthcoming). We include a variable indicating whether French

was the main language parents spoke to their children. To assess changes in selectivity over time, models include the intersection between those four variables and the time period.

RESULTS

Table 3 reports the results of the duration model. Men are more likely to experience subsidized migration, while there is no significant difference between men and women for unsubsidized migration. This result reflects the balanced sex ratio of DOM-mainland migrations and the slight overrepresentation of men among migrants who benefited from migration programs (Condon 2004). Migration was more likely between 1960 and 1981 than between 1982 and 1997, and even more than between 1998 and 2010. This is consistent with the slowdown in departures from the DOM to metropolitan France since the 1980s (Haddad 2018). Chances of unsubsidized migration are higher in Guadeloupe than in any other DOM, especially La Réunion. By contrast, there is no significant difference in chances of subsidized migration between La Réunion and Guadeloupe. In addition, the gap between Guadeloupe and Guyane is significantly higher for subsidized migration than it is for unsubsidized migration. These differences highlight how migration offices have been most successfully established in La Réunion (where there was both more investment by public authorities and less local resistances) and remained secondary in Guyane (which was a lesser target of migration policies).

Elder siblings are less likely to experience unsubsidized migration than younger siblings and unsubsidized migration is more likely within larger families. In line with previous literature, this suggests that there is a trade-off between getting returns on local resources and finding new opportunities outside the DOM, as they present different types of risks and potential returns. Larger families are more likely to diversify potential sources of income in order to decrease their average risk exposure, with some siblings investing locally

and others looking for outside resources through migration (Stark and Levhari 1982). While first-borns can expect to benefit from higher investment of their parents for their careers and maybe to inherit from land or businesses, siblings who are further down in the birth order have fewer prospects of local success, such that they are more likely to migrate (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012). We find no significant effect of birth order and number of siblings for subsidized migration.

[table 3 about here]

We find evidence of an increasing positive selection of migrants over time, with differences according to the type of migration and the measures of selection. First, having at least a junior high degree increases chances of unsubsidized and subsidized migration. This effect grows over time for both types of migration (table 4): it is significantly higher in 1982-1997 than in 1960-1981; it is also significantly higher in 1998-2010 than in 1982-1997. Having a parent who spoke mostly French at home, rather than creole or another language, has only a significant effect for unsubsidized migration between 1982 and 1997. However, the share of individuals whose parents did not primarily use French to speak to them consistently decreases over time, dropping from 41% for the 1945-1958 birth cohort to 26% for the 1983-1995 birth cohort. Consequently, small sample size is likely to explain the drop in significance for the 1998-2010 coefficient for unsubsidized migration.

[table 4 about here]

Parental education has no significant effect over chances of unsubsidized migration. By contrast, it has a significant effect on chances of subsidized migration and this effect changes over time. Between 1960 and 1981, the higher the parent was on the educational distribution, the lesser were the chances of subsidized migration. Between 1982 and 1997, as well as between 1998 and 2010, the higher the parent was on the educational distribution, the

higher were the chances of subsidized migration. We find no significant differences in this effect between the 1982-1997 and 1998-2010 periods. We observe the opposite pattern for the occupational position of the parent: it has no significant effect on the chances of subsidized migration and a significant effect on the chances of unsubsidized migration. Between 1982 and 2010, having a parent who works at an intermediate or upper position rather than at a lower position increased the chances of unsubsidized migration. We also find no significant differences in this effect between the 1982-1997 and 1998-2010 periods. Because education and occupation are correlated and we include them simultaneously in the model, the lack of significance of one dimension when the other is significant does not mean that there are no differences between migrants and non-migrants based on the former, but that the latter is the main driver of the selection mechanism. In other words, between 1982 and 2010, there may be positive selection of subsidized and unsubsidized migrants based on both parental education and parental occupation if considered separately, but selection of subsidized migrants relies more on education, while selection of unsubsidized migrants relies more on economic resources.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This research shows how migrants benefiting from pro-migration policies differ from other migrants, in the case of migration from the French Overseas Departments to metropolitan France. It confirms the impact of the economic depression on migrant selection and reveals migration programs' contrasted effects. Results show no evidence of either positive or negative selection of migrants who did not benefit from migration programs between 1960 and 1981. For migrants who benefited from migration programs during this period, results show negative selection based on parental education and positive selection based on individual education. We identify a clear tipping point in 1982, when migration becomes positively selective for both types of migration. From 1982 onwards, unsubsidized and

subsidized migrants are positively selected based on their having at least a junior high degree, and this effect increases over time. Unsubsidized migrants are also positively selected based on their parents' occupational position, while subsidized migrants are positively selected based on their parents' education.

Public discourse and migrants' narratives often frame migration to the mainland as an unavoidable path, a flight from unemployment: job opportunities are scarce in the DOM, apart for a certain demand for high-skilled labor (Temporal, Marie, and Bernard 2011). Within that push-pull frame, one could expect migration to benefit more to the low end of the educational or occupational distribution, especially since there are no legal barriers to migration and migration programs provide with monetary transfers facilitating migration. This research contradicts such assumption, confirming the importance of mediating migration drivers. Even between 1960 and 1981, when there were large opportunities for recruitment at low-skilled positions in mainland France and migration policies encouraged mass migration, migrants did not consistently have lower levels of cultural and economic capital than non-migrants did. We do find a negative effect of parental education on chances of subsidized migration between 1960 and 1981, but we also find a positive effect of holding at least a junior high degree. Contrary to what previous research suggests (Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012), legal barriers are therefore not the only factor preventing people with lower SES from migrating: they face difficulties even when there are open borders and migration-facilitating policies.

Archival documents suggest that Bumidom officials were not worried with recruiting potential migrants with little to no skills or even marginalized (Pattieu 2016). Our results on parental characteristics between 1960 and 1981 confirm that and show that past migration-facilitating policies increased migration chances for populations with lower SES. Such policies seem especially effective in that aspect when aid is granted without requirement and prospective migrants are walked through the process. Yet, results show that selection within

the most modest households of the DOM relied mostly on parental characteristics, and that – at equal socioeconomic background – teenagers and young adults with higher educational prospects were more likely to benefit from the program. It confirms the role of aspirations, especially for youth migration, and shows that accounting for both individual and parental characteristics is critical. The fact that unsubsidized migration was not selective while subsidized migration was negatively selective based on parental education further suggests that the action of the Bumidom polarized migration flows, channeling migration from the less well-off families and letting the more affluent migrants move without public aid.

As our results confirm, the dismantling of the Bumidom in 1981 marked the end of an era. This policy change reflected a turn in the economic context in metropolitan France, which affected selection, but it also had in itself an effect on migrant selection. Between 1982 and 2010, while selection based on individual education steadily increased for both types of migration, we observe positive selection based on parental occupation for unsubsidized migration and positive selection based on parental education for subsidized migration. This first means that the new economic and political setting limits access to migration, such that migrants are likely to come from the most endowed families in the DOM. This also shows that, even when they display a democratizing goal, migration offices do not cancel selection. They do however transform the nature of selection, as selection of subsidized migrants seems to rely on education and selection of unsubsidized migrants on economic resources.

Turning back to the literature on access to social rights, we can interpret this dynamic as the joint result of the income cap set to be eligible for subsidies, the new criteria targeting educational and career aspirations, and the reinforcement of the administrative process required to access the programs. While the former limits positive selection based on wealth, the latter exclude migrants who display lower academic achievements and less ease with the bureaucratic system. The positive selection of subsidized migration might also result from the

reframing of migrations policies within a narrative of "youth mobility". The focus on career plans, higher education or vocational training restricts the definition of legitimate migration, conditioning access to subsidies, which is likely to prevent individuals with lower educational aspirations or performances from applying. Overall, despite their democratizing goal, recent migration programs partly fail to grant access to migration to individuals with lower socioeconomic backgrounds, not only because of the level of requirements they set, but also because of the complexity of the process prospective migrants have to go through to prove they meet these requirements.

By comparing the social background of migrants benefiting from migration programs, migrants moving without them, and non-migrants, this paper fills a gap in a literature still lacking empirical assessments of the effect of migration policies on migrant selection. Looking at migration from the French Overseas departments to mainland France, our analysis shows the persistence of pro-migration policies, with a shift from negatively or non-selected migration to more selective migration. It brings empirical confirmation of an increasing trend in migration selection, rather than restriction. When the four "old colonies" became French departments in 1946, the State had to work not only towards equal rights between the DOM and the mainland, but also towards convergence in socioeconomic conditions. This project has yet to be completed and governments have consistently conceived mobility as a channel of convergence. Yet, pro-migration policies have become more selective over time. The programs have set income caps, which emphasize their focus on the less well-off families. However, their project-oriented requirements and the bureaucratic process associated with them have created a gap between their proclaimed goal of equal opportunity and the actual distribution of migration chances. In this case of state-sponsored mobility, migration aid is thus an ambivalent mediating migration driver. Last, the focus of this paper on the effect of pro-migration policies should not eclipse other key drivers of French Overseas-mainland

flows, especially migrant networks, which have played an important role (Condon and Byron 2007). Further research is therefore needed to understand how these different factors interplay in a driver complex (Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long 2018).

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TABLES

Table 1: Timeline of policies facilitating DOM-mainland migrations

Year	Policy	Scope
1945	Discharged soldiers from the DOM are encouraged to stay in metropolitan France.	DOM
1946-1997	Men drafted for military service are often posted in metropolitan France	DOM
1963-1981	160 300 DOM migrants receive the help of the office for DOM migration (Bumidom) with one-time financial help, as well as workers and family reunification programs.	French Caribbean, La Réunion
1965-	Michel Debré founds the National Committee for reception and actions towards Reunionese in mobility (CNARM). The CNARM focuses on helping migrant workers from La Réuion.	La Réunion
1982-2010	The Agency for Integration and Protection of Overseas Workers (ANT) replaces the Bumidom, with reduced funding and scope of action.	DOM
2002-	The *passeport mobilité* or mobility passport is designed to help the youth from the DOM (under 31) leave their home region to pursue training or education or to find a job.	DOM
2003-	Measures of "territorial continuity" are extended to the DOM, allocating extensive funds to each region to facilitate DOM-mainland circulation	DOM
2010	The Overseas Agency for Mobility (Ladom) replaces the ANT	DOM

Table 2: Socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and stayers in the sample

	Stayers	Unsubsidized Migrants	Subsidized Migrants
Number of siblings (mean)	3.2	3.1	3.4
Birth order (mean)	1.9	1.8	2.1
Education (%)			
≥ Junior high degree	72.9	87.6	91.2
Parental education (%)			
≤ Junior high degree	65.5	61.7	62.4
Professional degree	19.9	14.8	22.2
≥ High school degree	14.6	23.6	15.4
Parent spoke mostly French (%)	60.0	78.9	67.4
Parental occupation (%)			
Lower	78.1	67.2	74.6
Intermediate	16.4	19.7	19.9
Upper	5.5	13.1	5.6
N	10,411	2,436	600

Weighted means and distributions | Source: MFV (INED, 2010)

Table 3: Results of the discrete-time duration model expressed in relative risk ratios

	Unsubsidized migration		Subsidized migration	
	Risk ratio	Confidence interval	Risk ratio	Confidence interval
Gender				
Male	1.07	[0.98,1.18]	1.25**	[1.05,1.48]
Time period (ref: 1960-1981)				
1982-1997	0.35***	[0.25,0.49]	0.51*	[0.25,1.05]
1998-2010	0.30***	[0.21,0.44]	0.59	[0.28,1.24]
Place of birth (ref: Guadeloupe)				
Martinique	0.77***	[0.66,0.89]	0.69***	[0.54,0.88]
Guyane	0.86*	[0.72,1.02]	0.52***	[0.38,0.72]
La Réunion	0.45***	[0.38,0.54]	1.07	[0.84,1.37]
Birth order	1.04**	[1.00,1.07]	0.98	[0.92,1.06]
Number of siblings	1.09***	[1.06,1.14]	1.05	[0.98,1.11]
Respondent parent = male	0.98	[0.87,1.12]	0.86	[0.71,1.05]
Education				
≥ Junior High degree	1.20	[0.90,1.60]	1.82*	[0.97,3.43]
1982-1997 × Junior High degree	1.37*	[0.98,1.91]	1.11	[0.52,2.37]
1998-2010 × Junior High degree	1.94***	[1.37,2.76]	2.06*	[0.97,4.38]
Parent spoke mainly French	1.20	[0.85,1.70]	1.52	[0.79,2.91]
1982-1997 × French	1.43*	[1.00,2.04]	0.89	[0.43,1.85]
1998-2010 × French	1.34	[0.92,1.95]	0.90	[0.45,1.81]
Parental education	1.07	[0.58,1.98]	0.17*	[0.03,1.06]
1982-1997 × Parental education	1.39	[0.74,2.62]	7.74**	[1.12,53.34]
1998-2010 × Parental education	1.64	[0.85,3.15]	9.61**	[1.46,63.50]
Parental occupation (ref: lower positions)				
Intermediate or upper	0.73	[0.43,1.23]	0.64	[0.18,2.28]
1982-1997 × Intermediate/upper	1.74**	[1.02,2.98]	1.59	[0.41,6.08]
1998-2010 × Intermediate/upper	1.93**	[1.12,3.35]	1.77	[0.49,6.48]
Random intercept	2.72 [2.72,2.72]			
Var(Random intercept)	4.31*** [3.48,5.35]			
Observations	126,873			

95% confidence intervals in brackets | * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Multilevel multinomial logistic model with sibling random effects | Age coefficients omitted

Source: MFV (INED, 2010)

Table 4: Variation in the effect of education and parental occupation according to the period (contrasts of average marginal effects)

Variable	Outcome	Period	Difference		ℙ>chi²
Education ≥ Junior High degree	Unsubsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.005	[-0.001,0.012]	0.121
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.012	[-0.005,0.019]	0.001
	Subsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.000	[-0.003,0.003]	0.919
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.004	[0.001,0.007]	0.003
Parent in intermediate or upper occupation	Unsubsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.012	[-0.005,0.019]	0.028
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.015	[-0.001,0.012]	0.007
	Subsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.001	[-0.003,0.006]	0.500
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.002	[-0.002,0.007]	0.330
Parental education	Unsubsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.006	[-0.008,0.020]	0.408
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.010	[-0.004,0.025]	0.162
	Subsidized migration	1982-1997 vs 1960-1981	0.008	[0.000,0.016]	0.048
		1998-2010 vs 1960-1981	0.010	[0.002,0.002]	0.014

Source: MFV (INED, 2010)

APPENDIX

Table A1: Results of the static model on the sample without return migrants expressed in relative risk ratios (multinomial logistic regression)

	Unsubsidized migration		Subsidized migration	
Gender				
Male	1.24***	[1.13,1.36]	1.44***	[1.20,1.72]
Birth cohort (ref: 1945-1961)				
1962-1977	0.41***	[0.29,0.58]	0.57	[0.26,1.25]
1978-1995	0.15***	[0.10,0.23]	0.20***	[0.08,0.53]
Place of birth (ref: Guadeloupe)				
Martinique	0.81***	[0.70,0.93]	0.73**	[0.55,0.96]
Guyane	0.68***	[0.57,0.81]	0.43***	[0.31,0.61]
La Réunion	0.39***	[0.32,0.47]	0.95	[0.72,1.26]
Birth order	1.06***	[1.02,1.10]	1.00	[0.93,1.08]
Number of siblings	1.03*	[0.99,1.07]	0.99	[0.93,1.06]
Respondent parent = male	0.98	[0.87,1.11]	0.86	[0.69,1.08]
Education				
≥ Junior High degree	1.12	[0.84,1.48]	1.56	[0.83,2.95]
1962-1977× Junior High degree	1.61***	[1.15,2.24]	1.42	[0.69,2.94]
1978-1995× Junior High degree	3.06***	[2.12,4.40]	4.33***	[1.93,9.70]
Parent spoke mainly French	1.28	[0.93,1.78]	1.24	[0.55,2.78]
1962-1977× French	1.31	[0.91,1.89]	1.10	[0.48,2.52]
1978-1995× French	0.96	[0.65,1.44]	1.03	[0.43,2.45]
Parental education	0.60*	[0.33,1.09]	0.68	[0.19,2.37]
1962-1977× Parental education	1.89*	[0.99,3.62]	0.98	[0.24,3.99]
1978-1995× Parental education	2.80***	[1.45,5.41]	2.33	[0.61,8.83]
Parental occupation (ref: lower positions)				
Intermediate or upper	1.00	[0.64,1.58]	0.41	[0.13,1.30]
1962-1977× Intermediate/upper	1.07	[0.66,1.72]	2.71	[0.75,9.85]
1978-1995× Intermediate/upper	1.35	[0.82,2.20]	2.53	[0.77,8.33]
N	13,428			

Source: MFV (INED, 2010)

Table A2: Results of the static model on the sample with return migrants expressed in relative risk ratios (multinomial logistic regression)

	Unsubsidized migration		Subsidized migration	
Gender				
Male	1.22***	[1.12,1.33]	1.46***	[1.23,1.74]
Birth cohort (ref: 1945-1961)				
1962-1977	0.44***	[0.32,0.59]	0.61	[0.30,1.23]
1978-1995	0.17***	[0.12,0.25]	0.20***	[0.08,0.49]
Place of birth (ref: Guadeloupe)				
Martinique	0.82***	[0.72,0.94]	0.74**	[0.57,0.97]
Guyane	0.66***	[0.56,0.77]	0.44***	[0.31,0.61]
La Réunion	0.44***	[0.37,0.51]	0.97	[0.74,1.27]
Birth order	1.06***	[1.03,1.10]	1.00	[0.94,1.07]
Number of siblings	1.03*	[1.00,1.06]	1.01	[0.95,1.07]
Respondent parent = male	0.97	[0.87,1.09]	0.86	[0.69,1.06]
Education				
≥ Junior High degree	1.06	[0.82,1.36]	1.55	[0.84,2.83]
1962-1977× Junior High degree	1.67***	[1.23,2.26]	1.46	[0.73,2.92]
1978-1995× Junior High degree	3.19***	[2.29,4.43]	4.31***	[1.99,9.35]
Parent spoke mainly French	1.24	[0.92,1.65]	1.15	[0.54,2.42]
1962-1977× French	1.29	[0.94,1.79]	1.08	[0.50,2.33]
1978-1995× French	0.96	[0.67,1.37]	1.14	[0.51,2.56]
Parental education	0.66	[0.38,1.12]	0.77	[0.24,2.53]
1962-1977× Parental education	1.74*	[0.96,3.15]	0.85	[0.23,3.16]
1978-1995× Parental education	2.65***	[1.46,4.83]	2.12	[0.60,7.51]
Parental occupation (ref: lower positions)				
Intermediate or upper	0.97	[0.63,1.50]	0.39	[0.12,1.22]
1962-1977× Intermediate/upper	1.06	[0.68,1.67]	2.86	[0.80,10.22]
1978-1995× Intermediate/upper	1.42	[0.89,2.26]	2.71*	[0.83,8.83]
N	14,580			

Source: MFV (INED, 2010)